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Abstract 
The current paper reviews the findings from a series of psycholinguistic experiments 
using two different methods designed to probe the conceptual representation of plu-
ral expressions. Experiments using a novel number interference paradigm suggest-
ed that singular indefinite NPs within distributed predicates are mentally represented 
as multiple entities (Patson & Warren 2010), but that distributed predicates are con-
ceptually represented as multiple events only in the presence of strong cues to plu-
rality (Patson & Warren 2015). These findings show that the number interference 
paradigm can be used to probe when comprehenders mentally represent multiple 
events and entities. A second set of experiments used a picture-judgment task to 
begin to understand the nature of the plural representations created by compre-
henders. These studies suggest that the conceptual representations of plural defi-
nite descriptions are no more similar to pictures of small sets of items than they are 
to pictures of singletons (Patson et al. 2014). These findings and others contribute to 
a more nuanced view of how language comprehenders compute and represent 
number. Importantly, these findings introduce two experimental paradigms useful for 
probing plural representations. 
1 Processing and Representing Plurals: Methods 
for Testing 
Despite the fact that plural expressions present a number of interesting puzzles for 
language processing, very little work has explored the impact they have on compre-
henders’ processing. One reason for this may be that traditional experimental meth-
ods in psycholinguistics (e.g., self-paced reading, eye tracking, the visual world par-
adigm) do not lend themselves to probing the nature of comprehenders’ representa-
tions of plurals. Consider the sentence: There are books on the table. There are a 
number of questions we might ask about comprehenders’ representation of books. 
For example, do comprehenders build a representation that contains multiple books 
or do they simply represent a single token (Johnson-Laird 1983)? Neither hypothe-
sis leads to predictions about reading times, so self-paced reading and eye tracking 
during reading do not naturally address this question. In order to study the nature of 
plural representations, we need methods that are better suited to probe these ques-
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tions. The goal of this paper is to describe two methods that we have begun to use 
to investigate the nature of the plural representations that comprehenders generate 
during sentence processing. The first method is a modified self-paced reading 
method that includes a secondary task that is sensitive to whether multiple entities 
or events are present (section 1). The second method is a picture verification task. It 
has been used to probe the details of the conceptual representations that compre-
henders build for plurals (section 2). 
2 Do Comprehenders Represent Multiple Events 
and Entities when Processing Plurals? 
The first, most basic question we might ask about any expression is whether com-
prehenders represent it as single or multiple entities or events. This question is de-
ceptively complicated because there are multiple kinds of representations that might 
be generated for plurals. For example, some options for representing books in There 
are books on the table include: a single entity encompassing two or more books, a 
situationally appropriate number of individual books, a representation that incorpo-
rates both a set of books and the individual books within it, or even a single entity 
encompassing an unknown number of books. This last possibility is supported by 
evidence that the “more than one” interpretation assigned to plural expressions does 
not come from the semantic meaning of the phrase (Sauerland et al. 2005: 414). 
Consider the sentence in (1). 
(1) You are welcome to bring your children.  
(Sauerland et al. 2005: 417) 
Sauerland et al. argue that (1) would not be paraphrased as You are welcome to 
bring your two or more children. In a context where the speaker is unaware of how 
many children the addressee has, children is felicitous even if the addressee only 
has a single child. Additionally, the question of how comprehenders conceptually 
represent plural entities gets even more complicated when those plural sets interact 
with event representations. For example, for a sentence like The cats played in the 
sun, a comprehender must first build a representation for cats and then to it apply 
some representation of playing, which might be a single playing event jointly ac-
complished by all the cats, some kind of single playing event that incorporates pos-
sibly separate playing by some cats, separate playing events for each cat, or even 
some other representation.  
Adding an additional layer of complexity to this issue of representation is the fact 
that a growing body of work suggests that comprehenders often leave aspects of the 
linguistic content underspecified in their mental representations (e.g., Ferreira & 
Patson 2007). Underspecification is particularly relevant to the processing of plural 
definite descriptions because these referents are usually underspecified for numer-
osity. The example from Sauerland et al. (2005) above is an extreme example of 
this, but in English this underspecification is ubiquitous, as exemplified by the fact 
that books in the example sentence above could be referring to two books or 15 
books or 50 books, etc. This raises important questions, such as: are some of these 
proposed representations less specified and more default than others? Can any 
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aspect of any representation be well- versus under-specified? What would a repre-
sentation that is unspecified for number be like?  
An important first step towards addressing some of these questions above 
would be the ability to determine under what conditions comprehenders represent 
multiple events and entities. To this end, we (Patson & Warren 2010) extended a 
number-of-words judgment task introduced by Berent et al. (2005). This method 
takes advantage of the fact that a plural introduces conceptual number information. 
In the original Berent et al. study, participants were shown either a single word or 
two words on a computer screen and asked to judge how many words appeared on 
the screen. Berent et al. found that participants were slower to make correct judg-
ments to a single word when it was plural than when it was singular. Berent et al. 
argued that this was due to interference between the number judgment task and the 
abstract number information inherent to plural NPs.1 We extended this method to 
sentences (Patson & Warren 2010). In our first experiment, participants read sen-
tences that ended with either a singular or plural definite description such as: The 
bartender served the beer to the man/men (Patson & Warren 2010: 784). The sen-
tences were presented in one- and two-word chunks displayed in the center of the 
computer screen. At the critical word (man/men in the example above) the font color 
changed from black to blue. Participants were trained that when the font changed to 
blue, they were to decide whether one or two words appeared on the computer 
screen and press the “1” or “2” key to indicate their decision (see Fig. 1). The time it 
took to make that decision was measured. In all of our experiments, the critical word 
is always a single word (i.e., requires a “one word” judgment). We found that partici-
pants were significantly faster to make the single word judgment when the word was 
singular compared to when it was plural. This confirmed that the paradigm could be 
extended to plural-marked words in sentences. However, this method would be 
even more useful if it were sensitive not only to the morphosyntactic marking of plu-
rality, but also to number information driven by the sentential context. To test this, 
we conducted a second experiment in which morphosyntactically singular noun 
phrases were embedded in distributed predicates, as in Each of the men carried a 
box (Patson & Warren 2010: 785). If comprehenders assign wide scope to the dis-
tributing quantifier, it would result in an interpretation that can be paraphrased as 
“for each man there is a box that he carried”. The most natural reading of this would 
involve multiple boxes. If comprehenders assign wide scope to the existential quan-
tifier, it would result in an interpretation that can be paraphrased as “there is a single 
box and each man carried it”.  
                                               
1 Berent et al. (2005) found that participants did not consistently take longer to make a “two 
word” judgment when two singular words were on the screen compared to when two plural 
words were on the screen. 
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Fig. 1: Example experimental trial 
In our second experiment, we compared sentences with distributed quantifiers ((2a) 
& (3a)) to sentences with collective quantifiers ((2b) & (3b)). We also varied whether 
the grammatical number on the critical word was morphosyntactically singular (as in 
(2a-b)) or morphosyntactically plural (as in (3a-b)). The morphosyntactically plural 
conditions provided a baseline to control for any potential differences in how difficult 
the two quantifiers might be to process.   
(2) a. Each of the men carried a box. 
b. Together the men carried a box.  
(Patson & Warren 2010: 785) 
(3) a. Each of the men carried boxes. 
b. Together the men carried boxes. 
The critical word was the NP in the predicate; box in the examples above. As in the 
previous experiment, we found that participants were faster to make a single word 
judgment when the word was morphosyntactically singular compared to when it was 
morphosyntactically plural. Critically, this was qualified by an interaction between 
quantifier and number marking; participants were slower to make the single word 
judgment when the word was singular and embedded in a distributed predicate (2a) 
compared to when it was embedded in a collective predicate (2b). This suggests 
that participants conceptually represented singular-marked NPs in distributed predi-
cates as plural, meaning that wide scope had been assigned to the distributing 
quantifier. This experiment provides evidence that the number-of-words judgment 
paradigm is sensitive to plurality driven by the sentential context, not simply the 
morphosyntactic marking on the noun phrase. But importantly, the only way to rep-
resent the singular-marked NPs as plural in these sentences is to represent the ref-
erents of those NPs as distributed across multiple events. This hints that the current 
paradigm may be able to index whether a comprehender has represented a single 
event or multiple events. 
We therefore directly investigated whether the number-of-words judgment para-
digm could be used to index event plurality (Patson & Warren 2015). In our first ex-
5 
periment, participants read sentences that contained either an iterative (as in (4)) or 
a punctual event (as in (5)). Note that the iterative event happens multiple times, 
instantiating multiple events, whereas the punctual event occurs once, instantiating 
only a single event. 
(4) Throughout the day, the student sneezed in the back of the classroom. 
(5) After twenty minutes, the student sneezed in the back of the classroom.  
(Patson & Warren 2015: 1253) 
On the critical verb region (sneezed in (4)-(5)), participants were slower to make the 
single word judgment when the sentence evoked an iterative event (4) compared to 
a punctual event (5). This suggests that the paradigm is sensitive to the representa-
tion of multiple events as well as multiple entities. Given this, we used the paradigm 
to begin to investigate when multiple events are instated during processing and un-
der what conditions inherently distributed verbs instantiate multiple event represen-
tations (Patson & Warren 2015). 
There is reason to think that predicate interpretation may sometimes be delayed 
until the full semantics of an event are available (e.g., Pickering & Frisson 2001). 
One reason for this is that post-verbal arguments can be critical to event interpreta-
tion. For example, the direct object of a verb can influence whether a plural event is 
interpreted as distributed or collective. Consider the sentence The men carried… If 
the sentence were continued with “a piano”, most people would assign a collective 
reading to the predicate because world knowledge would make a distributed reading 
implausible. However, if the sentence were continued with “a briefcase”, world 
knowledge might make a distributed reading more likely. Given this, a delaying 
strategy might make sense.  
To investigate this issue, we compared collective (6) and distributed (7) events 
with transitive (pitched) and intransitive verbs (slept): 
(6) Together the hikers calmly pitched/slept in a small tent. 
(7) Each of the hikers calmly pitched/slept in a small tent.  
(Patson & Warren 2015: 1257) 
The rationale is that at the verb, the comprehender has access to the full event se-
mantics for intransitive verbs, but not transitive verbs, which are awaiting a direct 
object. If comprehenders wait for the full event semantics before interpreting distrib-
uted quantifiers, then interference on the number-of-words judgment task should 
only occur for distributed events with intransitive verbs. Alternatively, if they do not 
wait for the full event semantics in the presence of a distributive quantifier, the inter-
ference on the number-of-words judgment task should be present for sentences with 
distributed quantifiers regardless of the verb type. Our results showed that partici-
pants were slower to make the single word judgment on the verb in a distributed 
context than in a collective context. There was no interaction with verb transitivity. 
This suggests that comprehenders do not necessarily wait for the full event seman-
tics before instantiating multiple events. 
The second question we asked was whether the inherent distributivity of a verb 
is enough to spur comprehenders to represent multiple events. From some of the 
experiments already discussed, it is clear that collective and distributive quantifiers 
can spur comprehenders to represent single or multiple entities and events. But 
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what if the cue to distributivity is less explicit, and comes from the semantics of the 
verb? Inherently distributed verbs are verbs that, if applied to a set, must be true of 
each member of the set. For example, contrast the sentences: The cats awoke and 
The cats played. The cats played can be interpreted to mean that every cat in the 
relevant set played by itself, or that the cats all played together as a group, or some-
thing intermediate with some cats playing singly and some together. This is not true 
of The cats awoke. That sentence can only be interpreted to mean that every cat in 
the relevant set woke up. Awoke is therefore inherently distributed. 
We designed an experiment to test whether comprehenders build representa-
tions with multiple events for inherently distributed verbs with plural subjects. This 
experiment compared number-of-words judgment times on the verb for sentences 
like (8)-(10). 
(8) The boy in the house unexpectedly awoke before dawn. 
(9) The boys in the house unexpectedly awoke before dawn. 
(10) The boy and the girl in the house unexpectedly awoke before dawn. 
In (8), the subject of the verb is singular, so there is only one event. In (10), the con-
joined subject (the boy and the girl) provides two individuated referents (Patson & 
Warren 2011), so the inherently distributed verb should apply to both and generate a 
representation with two events. Therefore, number-of-words judgment times should 
be faster on the verb in (8) than in (10). Indeed, participants were faster to judge the 
verb as a single word when the subject was singular (8) compared to when it was 
conjoined (10). What is not clear is whether comprehenders will create multiple 
events when the subject is a plural definite description, as in (9). Previous work indi-
cates that plural definite descriptions are represented as undifferentiated sets and 
thus only introduce a single referent (Patson & Ferreira 2009; Patson & Warren 
2011). If the predicate applies to that single plural referent and fails to distribute 
across the entities within the set, then number-of-words judgment times on (9) might 
pattern with (8). If the inherent distributivity of the verb combines with the plural sub-
ject to create a distributed representation of multiple events, then number-of-words 
judgment times on (9) should pattern with (10). The results were that the judgment 
times for (9) patterned with (8). This suggests that comprehenders did not create a 
representation that contained multiple events for inherently distributed verbs with 
plural definite descriptions as subjects. This may be because the distributivity inher-
ent to a verb’s semantics is not enough to force comprehenders to represent distrib-
uted events. Instead, in order to instantiate multiple events, comprehenders need 
stronger cues to plurality such as the presence of multiple referents to which to ap-
ply a predicate. Without multiple referents, the inherently distributed event is left 
undifferentiated and underspecified. 
The work reviewed so far suggests that the number-of-words judgment task can 
be used to index whether a conceptual representation contains multiple events or 
entities. This task is therefore an important tool in efforts to understand the condi-
tions under which comprehenders generate conceptual representations containing 
single versus multiple entities and events. Results from this task also go a small way 
towards characterizing plural representations. The findings reviewed so far suggest 
that comprehenders do specify plurality in their mental representations of plural enti-
ties, because if they left number completely unspecified (e.g., Sauerland et al. 
2005), there should have been no interference for plurals in the number-of-words 
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judgment task. Still, this represents only a small step towards characterizing plural 
representations. Additional methods that more directly query other properties of 
these representations are needed. 
3 How Detailed are the Conceptual Representations 
for Plurals During Sentence Comprehension?  
Several studies have used a picture-matching paradigm to probe the conceptual 
representations of plurals created by comprehenders during the processing of sen-
tences. This method is grounded in research on situated cognition (e.g., Barsalou 
1999). Situated cognition argues that comprehenders’ conceptual representations 
contain many experientially-derived properties of the entities and events they en-
counter. Consistent with this, evidence suggests that language comprehenders rep-
resent information such as shape, size, color, and the emotional content of linguistic 
content. The picture-matching paradigm has been widely used to test hypotheses 
derived from theories of situated cognition (e.g., Stanfield & Zwaan 2001; Zwaan et 
al. 2002). In this paradigm, participants read or listen to a sentence and then see a 
picture. Their task is to judge whether or not the picture is of an object that was in 
the sentence. For example, Stanfield & Zwaan (2001) used this paradigm to provide 
evidence that comprehenders represent information about the shape of an object 
during language comprehension. In their experiment, participants read sentences 
like: 
(11) The ranger saw an eagle in the tree. 
(12) The ranger saw an eagle in the sky. 
In their study, participants were faster to identify a picture of an eagle that matched 
the context of the sentence. So in sentence (11) participants were faster when an 
eagle was depicted with its wings folded compared to with its wings spread out in 
flight. The reverse was true for sentence (12). Stanfield & Zwaan (2001) interpreted 
this as evidence that comprehenders conceptually simulate the action described in 
the sentence. If comprehenders simulate properties of the objects and actions they 
read or hear about, and we can query those simulations, doing so should provide 
another source of information regarding comprehenders’ mental representations of 
number. We therefore used this picture-matching paradigm to investigate compre-
henders’ conceptual representations of plural noun phrases. 
In Patson et al. (2014), participants read a sentence that contained either a sin-
gular noun (as in (13)), a plural definite description (as in (14)), or a two-quantified 
plural (as in (15)).  
(13) The parent handed the child the crayon.  
(14) The parent handed the child the crayons. 
(15) The parent handed the child the two crayons.  
(Patson et al. 2014: 1352) 
After reading the sentence, participants pressed a button and then saw a picture of 
exactly one of the critical objects (i.e. a crayon for the example above), exactly two 
critical objects, or multiple (between 3 and 6) critical objects (see Fig. 2).  
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Fig. 2: Example trial containing plural definite description and one pictured object 
Participants were instructed to decide whether or not the picture was of an object(s) 
that was mentioned in the sentence. They were instructed and trained to ignore the 
number of objects and base their judgment on object identity alone. Patson et al. 
(2014) measured how quickly participants responded affirmatively to the picture. 
The results indicated that for conditions in which numerosity was explicitly specified 
in the sentence (e.g., singular NP, two-quantified NP), participants were faster to 
respond to a picture with an exactly matching number of objects than a picture with 
a non-matching number of objects. For example, after reading a singular noun 
phrase, participants were faster to accurately decide that the picture was of an ob-
ject that was mentioned in the sentence if there was only one object pictured rather 
than multiple objects. This finding is straightforward: when number information is 
made explicit, comprehenders have a detailed conceptual representation that con-
tains explicit number information. However, for the plural definite description condi-
tions, participants did not show a preference for pictures that depicted more than 
one object compared to pictures that depicted a single object. In a second experi-
ment, we confirmed that this effect occurs even when plurality is introduced concep-
tually and not via a plural definite description by having participants read sentences 
that had either a distributive (16) or a collective (17) quantifier. 
(16) Each of the men carried a box.  
(17) Together the men carried a box. 
After reading a sentence with a collective quantifier, participants were faster to iden-
tify a picture of a single box compared to a picture of multiple boxes. After reading a 
sentence with a distributive quantifier, participants showed no preference for either 
picture type.  
One interpretation of these findings is that they are consistent with the theory 
that plurality is semantically unmarked for number (e.g., Sauerland et al. 2005) and 
therefore indicate that comprehenders do not explicitly represent number infor-
mation when building a conceptual representation for a plural noun phrase. If num-
ber is unspecified in a representation, then there is no reason that pictures of multi-
ple objects should match it better than pictures of a single object. However, this in-
terpretation is inconsistent with the findings of interference for plural definite descrip-
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tions in the number-of-words judgment task. That interference suggests that repre-
sentations for plural definite descriptions really are plural and contain multiple enti-
ties. An alternative explanation of the findings in Patson et al. (2014) is that compre-
henders’ final representations of plural definite descriptions are specified as plural, 
but that during intermediate stages of processing, comprehenders might also con-
struct representations that include a singular representation. If picture matching is 
sensitive to these intermediate representations, that could explain Patson et al. 
(2014)’s findings, yet not necessarily be inconsistent with the evidence from the 
number-of-words judgment task. This explanation is consistent with a scalar implica-
ture account of the plural (Patson 2016a) as we will describe below. 
The scalar implicature theory of the plural was introduced to attempt to solve a 
well-known puzzle regarding the interpretation of plural definite descriptions. Con-
sider the following set of examples. 
(18) a. Ben fed a shark. 
b. Ben fed sharks. 
c. Ben fed more than one shark. 
(19) a. Ben didn’t feed a shark. 
b. Ben didn’t feed sharks. 
c. Ben didn’t feed more than one shark.  
(Patson 2016a: 1140-1041) 
For most people, (18b) and (18c) are essentially the same in meaning, and distinct 
from (18a). However, in the negated cases, (19a) and (19b) are usually judged as 
equivalent and distinct from (19c) (Sauerland et al. 2005; Tieu et al. 2014). As men-
tioned previously, this suggests that in some contexts (such as negation), “more 
than one” is not always the appropriate interpretation of a plural definite description. 
This pattern of interpretations suggests that the plural is semantically unmarked, or 
weakly marked, for number, whereas the singular is strongly marked for number. If 
the plural is semantically unmarked (or weakly marked) for number, then the “more 
than one” interpretation derived in most contexts must come from a pragmatic infer-
ence. One hypothesis is that when comprehending a plural, comprehenders gener-
ate a scalar implicature (e.g., Spector 2007; Tieu et al. 2014). A scalar implicature is 
a type of inference that arises when a weak expression is used instead of a stronger 
expression. Consider the sentence in (20). 
(20) Zoe ate some of the cookies.  
(Patson 2016b: 1188) 
Although the statement in (20) does not logically rule out the possibility that Zoe in 
fact ate all of the cookies, it is typically interpreted as meaning that Zoe ate some 
but not all of the cookies. Comprehenders seem to assume that speakers use the 
strongest labels that are compatible with their intended meaning, so upon encoun-
tering a weaker expression comprehenders assume that the stronger meaning was 
not appropriate (Grice 1975). Thus, they assume that if a speaker intended to indi-
cate that Zoe ate all of the cookies, they would have used the quantifier all because 
that would be the strongest way to communicate that state of affairs. Applying this 
logic to plural definite descriptions, a scalar implicature account assumes that the 
literal, semantically defined interpretation of a plural definite description is something 
like “at least one” and an implicature must be made to arrive at the “more than one” 
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interpretation. The logic of the implicature is as follows: a plural definite description 
can refer to a single entity, but if the speaker intended to refer to only one entity they 
would have used a stronger form (i.e., the singular) to express that.  
Tieu et al. (2014) provided evidence for a scalar implicature account of plurality 
using a truth-value judgment task. For example, they asked participants to decide 
whether the question Does a dog have tails? (Tieu et al. 2014: 125) is true or false. 
The question should be answered “false” because a dog only has one tail. Tieu et al. 
found that both adults and children interpreted plural nouns as meaning “more than 
one” when the nouns were in positive contexts (or upward-entailing environments). 
That is, they answered correctly (“false”) when asked Does a dog have tails? indi-
cating they interpreted “tails” as meaning more than one. However, participants 
were less likely to answer correct when nouns were in negative contexts (or down-
ward-entailing environments), such as A dog does not have tails. With these sen-
tences, the answer should be “true” because a dog only has a single tail, however, 
participants answered “false” suggesting they did not interpret “tails” to mean more 
than one in these contexts (i.e., instead they interpreted the sentence as asking 
whether a dog has a tail.) This is consistent with typical scalar implicature patterns 
showing that scalar implicatures are more likely to be made in upward-entailing ra-
ther than downward-entailing environments (e.g., Chierchia 2004; Levinson 2000).2 
The scalar implicature account of the plural could be used to explain the lack of 
a preference for a picture of multiple objects after reading a plural definite descrip-
tion reported in Patson et al. (2014). Most accounts of scalar implicature processing 
assume that participants access both the logical (semantic) meaning and the prag-
matic meaning of the scalar term (e.g., Huang & Snedeker 2011). If logical meaning 
of plural is “at least one”, but it is pragmatically strengthened to “more than one”, 
then both of these meanings may be accessed during processing. If both meanings 
are activated, both may be represented conceptually (e.g., Kaup et al. 2006). For 
example, Kaup et al. found that during the processing of negated predicates such as 
The door is not open (Kaup et al. 2006: 1033), immediately at the end of the sen-
tence comprehenders are equally fast to respond to a picture of a door that is open 
and a door that is closed. They interpreted this as evidence that comprehenders 
simulate both the actual state of affairs and intermediate stages of linguistic pro-
cessing, e.g., the predicate that was to be negated. If, during the processing of sca-
lar terms, comprehenders simulate both the actual state of affairs (e.g., the pragmat-
ically strengthened meaning) as well as intermediate stages of linguistic representa-
tion (e.g., the logical meaning), then participants should be equally fast to respond to 
the picture that was consistent with their semantic representation (e.g., for a plural 
definite description that would be the singular picture) as the picture that was con-
sistent with their pragmatically derived representation (e.g., the plural picture). 
The results reported by Patson et al. (2014) do not distinguish between the un-
derspecification and the scalar implicature accounts of plural conceptual representa-
tion. The lack of preference for the plural picture over the singleton picture could 
have resulted because both were equally bad matches to participants’ underspeci-
fied conceptual representations. Alternatively, the lack of preference could have 
resulted because the singular and the plural meanings of the plural expression were 
                                               
2 Additionally, Tieu et al. (2014) found that children were less likely to compute plural infer-
ences than adults, which is also consistent with previous work showing that children are 
typically less likely to compute scalar implicature inferences than adults (e.g., Noveck 2001).  
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both equally active in the conceptual representation, as predicted by the scalar im-
plicature account. To distinguish between these two accounts, it is necessary to test 
situations in which they make different predictions. The underspecification account 
predicts that comprehenders should always respond similarly to all picture types 
after reading a plural definite description. This is due to the underspecified nature of 
the representation. On the other hand, the scalar implicature account places no 
constraints on the specificity of the plural representation. It would be consistent with 
comprehenders responding differently to plural pictures with different properties.  
Patson (2016a) used this logic to provide evidence for the scalar implicature ac-
count. In her first experiment, comprehenders read sentences that contained plural 
definite descriptions. The sentences were written to evoke a particular spatial con-
figuration for the plural set. For example, in the first experiment, the sentential con-
text either described a spatial configuration in which the individual items that com-
prised the plural were spread out (e.g., the wind scattered the leaves) or the items 
were gathered closely together (e.g., a pile of leaves). After reading the sentence, 
comprehenders were shown a picture that matched the spatial configuration, mis-
matched the configuration, or was a single object. Patson (2016a) found that partici-
pants were faster to respond to a picture when it matched the spatial configuration 
implied in the sentence than when it did not (cf., Stanfield & Zwaan 2001). Im-
portantly, participants were also faster to respond to a picture of a single item than 
to a picture that mismatched the spatial configuration implied in the sentence. This 
pattern of findings is consistent with a scalar implicature account of the plural, ac-
cording to which comprehenders reading a plural definite description activate the 
semantic meaning of the plural (which may be something like “at least one”) on their 
way to generating a highly detailed plural conceptual representation with information 
about the arrangement of the individual entities that make up the plural set. The fact 
that participants were faster to respond to a picture that matched the spatial distribu-
tion of objects implied in the sentence suggests that comprehenders do not leave 
number information conceptually unspecified. This is because, in order to represent 
how the entities within the plural set are spatially related to one another, multiple 
entities must be represented.  
The work reviewed here provides some insight into how plural expressions are 
represented during processing. Experiments using a novel number interference par-
adigm suggested that singular indefinite NPs within distributed predicates are con-
ceptually represented as multiple entities (Patson & Warren 2010), but that distribut-
ed predicates are mentally represented as multiple events only in the presence of 
strong cues to plurality (e.g., distributed quantifiers or multiple referents in the sub-
ject, Patson & Warren 2015). A series of picture-judgment experiments suggest that 
the conceptual representations of plural definite descriptions are no more similar to 
pictures of small sets of items than they are to pictures of single objects (Patson et 
al. 2014), which may be consistent with a scalar implicature account of the plural. 
There is still much work to be done on the representation of plurals. For example, in 
a second experiment, Patson (2016a) used the picture-matching paradigm to pro-
vide evidence that suggests that comprehenders represent information about set 
size unless the set size becomes uncountable. At that point, comprehenders may 
underspecify the conceptual representation or represent a single token (Johnson-
Laird 1983). Work is needed to gain a deeper understanding about how large set 
sizes are conceptually represented. Furthermore, recent work using the picture-
matching paradigm shows that after reading a plural definite description, participants 
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maintain activation of the singular representation even after a 1500 ms delay (Pat-
son 2016b). This suggests that the activation of the singular picture may not be due 
to the activation of the logical interpretation of the plural. If it were, the activation 
should decrease over time, such that adding a 1500 ms delay between the sentence 
and picture should cause participants to show a preference for a picture of multiple 
objects compared to a picture of a single object (Kaup et al. 2006). The finding that 
participants maintain activation of the singular representation over a 1500 ms delay 
suggests that its activation was not due to an intermediate stage of processing. In-
stead, the singular representation may be part of the conceptual representation of 
the plural. Much work is still needed to investigate the nature of the conceptual rep-
resentations created during the processing of plural expressions. 
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